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Abstract 
The paper is about the political consequences of increasing economic 
inequality in Western economies. Political theorists have often stressed that 
democracy is in troubles when its population is not broadly uniform in income 
and wealth because unequal economic resources can easily translate into a 
surplus of political resources in the hands of the few. The connections between 
economic inequality and democracy, however, are not easy to detect and the 
body of literature is not so large to provide robust assessments of their complex 
relationship. The aim of this paper is to review the links between the two and to 
offer some hints on the political relevance of the inequality consequences, if 
any, on democracy.  
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
This paper is a substantial re-modulation and extension of Ch.5 
“Inequality and Democracy” written by the author and part of the 
book “Inequality: a short history” co-authored with Michele Alacevich 
[Brookings Institution, Washington, 2018 and Agenda Publisher, 
London, 2018]. 
Starting from the statement that economic and social inequality is 
not expected to convert necessarily into political inequality in a 
democracy, the interesting question is what happens when it does. 
The topic of this paper is a broad inquiry into the effects of inequality 
on the economic and social environment as well as into the effects of 
a worsened economic and social context on the political 
environment, still within a democratic framework.  
While theorizing leads to a positive correlation between inequality 
and deterioration of democracy, the empirical results show that the 
validation of the transmission of socio-economic inequality into 
political inequality is still scant, and the main cause is due to the 
rudimentary state of the measurement of political influence, and to 
the difficulty of measuring democracy and its quality. 
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INTRODUCTION  
It is sad to admit that only recently the research in Economics has become 
interested in the personal distribution of economic resources, topic that has 
never been central in the economic thought of whatever period and 
orientation. One of the reasons for a renewed interest – if not the main one – 
is that economically developed countries are now experiencing an alarming 
degree of inequality. In the twenty-first century prolonged unemployment, 
declining labour-share, the increasing accumulation of wealth by the few 
coexisting with stagnant incomes for the rest, and a steeper social ladder, are 
the main factors that have brought the personal distribution of income to 
centre stage. Today economic inequality is at the forefront of political debate, 
arguably because social movements have emerged that forced all of us to turn 
our attention to this issue. 
This paper looks exclusively at the relationship between economic 
inequality and democracy. I maintain that (a certain degree of) inequality 
damages growth, worsens social cleavages and eventually deteriorates the 
quality of the democratic setting hampering a full enjoying of democracy by 
low-income people.  
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1. TWO QUESTIONS 
The previous sentence contains two separate issues: one is the detrimental 
effect of inequality on the economic and social environment and one is the 
effect of a worsened economic and social context on the political 
environment still within a democratic framework. The first aspect mainly 
relates to growth and its relevant social impact. It is undeniable that growth is 
a sort of pre-requisite to an overall improvement in living conditions, but 
growth can both smooth and intensify differences whether it benefits the 
entire population or just one part of it respectively. The second aspect 
concerns the reverberation of the effects of economic inequality on the 
democratic context. The specific question is whether people can be politically 
equal if they are socially unequal. 
1.1 FIRST QUESTION  
Inequality: economic and social consequences 
The interest of economists in assessing the relation between inequality and 
growth has been mainly to establish whether tackling inequality might make 
societies wealthier.  
However, still today the answer to the question “does inequality slow 
growth” is only tentative, since the main theoretical forces shaping the 
relationship may be conflicting. Two are the basic arguments that many 
possible explanations can flow into: “incentive” or “opportunity”. Inequality 
affects growth positively by providing incentives to work, to invest and take 
risks, and/or inequality affects growth negatively by subtracting opportunities 
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to the poor and low-income people. Consequences of inequality for growth 
will depend on which of these forces prevails. 
In the first view – the traditional one – the main concern is the size of 
the pie and the priority of the individual.  The traditional view maintained that 
supporting the rich would increase aggregate savings, which in turn would 
increase investment with benefits for the growth of GDP. So far so good. 
However, in order to become “investment” savings has to be transferred to 
firms through the financial and/or the banking system. Unfortunately, 
nowadays both seem to have a sustained degree of inertia towards theirs 
preeminent function and both prefer to turn into a more lucrative 
“financialization”. Moreover, and quite independently on savings, investment 
has to be an attractive economic option, and Keynes taught us since that 
investment depends first and foremost on demand-expectations rather than 
on fund-availability. Thus, for more than one reason a mismatch between the 
supply (savings) and the demand (investment) of loanable funds can occur, 
and the process of capital accumulation can be relented or even stopped. A 
serious challenge to growth may come into action depending on the structure 
of the economy – whether the main sectors are high-tech or not– and on the 
size of the firms – whether they are big enough and able to finance 
themselves in the international markets.  In other words, there is no 
automaticity between the existence of even a big amount of saving and the 
realization of investment, as the recent experience in the majority of Western 
economies confirms.  
Again, in the traditional view the economic perspective holds that in a 
highly egalitarian framework incentives thin out, and the total amount of 
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productive effort in the economy decreases making all - including the poor - 
worse off than in a less egalitarian context. According to this view, in a market 
economy inequality reflects the true abilities or inabilities of people and the 
“natural” differences among them, provided (at least in the democratic 
version of this line of thought) that they are given equality of opportunity by 
the state. This position had its manifesto in the 1953 Milton Friedman’s 
article, with his assessment that “Individual choice through the market can 
greatly modify the effect on the personal distribution of income both of 
circumstances outside the control of individuals concerned and of collective 
actions designed to affect the distribution of income,” such as taxation and 
subsidies.1  Still in the traditional view, the perspective holds that taxes and 
transfers implemented according to any “median voter” theory slow down the 
pace of growth because of the distortion brought by redistribution.  According 
to this so- called theorem,2 in a democratic system the combination of taxes 
and transfers will be the one preferred by the voter who stays exactly in the 
middle of the distribution: the voter who has the median income. Since the 
empirical distributions in all advanced economies exhibit a median income 
lower than the mean, the higher the economic inequality the higher the 
combination of taxes and transfers in the preferences of the median voter 
should be.  
                                                   
1 Milton Friedman, “Choice, Chance and the Personal Distribution of Income,” Journal of 
Political Economy 61, no. 4, August 1953, 277–90, at pp. 277–78. 
2 This evergreen theorem was originally introduced in Duncan Black, “On the Rationale of 
Group Decision-making,” Journal of Political Economy 56, no. 1, 1948, 23–34, and later 
developed in Kevin W. S. Roberts, “Voting over Income Tax Schedule,” Journal of Public 
Economics 8, no. 3, 1977, 329–40, and Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, “A Rational 
Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Political Economy 89, 1981, 914–27.  
  
7 
 
The endogenous growth theory of the 1990s contributed theoretically 
to alter this traditional line of thought. Hinging on the consideration that 
human capital is as important as (if not more important than) real capital, it 
brought education to the forefront. If education becomes pivotal for growth, 
and if surging inequality means shrinking opportunities for poor or low-
income people, a transformation not for the better will occur resulting in 
under-investment in human capital. Informational asymmetries and credit 
constraints will take place. When credit-constraint binds people without 
tangible assets in their borrowing capacity and schooling becomes too 
expensive for low-income families, investment in human capital would 
decline, and growth would seriously be challenged in a self-reinforcing 
mechanism through the lock-in effect. If education becomes financially 
unaffordable, it also becomes less relevant for the low-educated ones, who 
often are the same families, and if a society is divided in terms of resources, 
the more reluctant the rich are to spend money on society.  
Besides the impact on human capital accumulation, other reasons exist 
for inequality ceasing to be – if possible – “useful” for growth. Simply put, let 
us suppose that the falling wages of the “working poor” – which lead to a 
shrink in consumption - combine with the increasing salaries of the “working 
rich”, the top managers who are not themselves owners of the capital but 
work for a capitalist who is usually hidden from the public eye. Short-term 
rather than long-term profit is the likely goal of these managers since their 
income would reflect the stock-market value of the firm. Short-term 
investment – which is generally a financial kind of investment – would replace 
the long-term one, investment in real capacity. Both outcomes – shrink in 
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consumption and stagnation if not reduction in investment – would eventually 
lead to a contraction of the aggregate demand and to pessimism in 
expectations on the firms’ side, discouraging even more their interest in 
investment and increasing instead their drive towards financial speculation. 
Thus, the split between the enrichment of the few and the interest of the 
many eventually sabotages growth itself.3 
Which mechanism has received validation from data? Ambiguously, the 
second one. The answer to the question “does inequality within a country 
slow its growth?” is likely to be positive4, though 1) the direction of causality 
appears not so easy to ascertain,5 2) the relation might be between inequality 
and the duration of growth-spells,6 and 3) net inequality should to be checked 
against growth in order to avoid the effect of re-distribution. 7  Moreover, a 
“meta-analysis” shows that the estimation methodology, quality of data and 
sampling do have a substantial role in directing results.8 What matters more, 
the co-existence of opposite theoretical explanations suggests the possible 
presence of non-linearity in the relationship, which implies that inequality 
might damage the economy after it reaches some “tipping point”9. This 
possibility was already found in Barro [2000] – though in a context of 
                                                   
3 For a complete account, see Stiglitz [2012] 
4 Cingano [2014] provides wide evidence of the results in the main empirical literature: see 
his Table A2-1 
5 Bertola [1993], Alesina and Rodrik [1994], Persson and Tabellini [1994], Perotti [1996], 
Alesina and Perotti [1996], Benabou [1996]  
6 Berg and Ostry [2011]. The growth-spell is the interval starting with a growth up-break 
and ending with a down-break. 
7 Ostry et al. [2014]  
8 De Dominicis et al. [2008], and also Cingano [2014], at pp. 12-13 
9 Fukuyama attributes this non-linearity directly to political reaction: “there is a tipping 
point at which social stratification becomes entrenched producing political polarization 
and distinctive patterns of behaviour between rich and poor”. Fukuyama [2011] at p. 85 
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development à-la-Kuznetz – and was proposed theoretically by Benhabib 
[2003] who, not surprisingly, linked together the two theories: increases in 
low levels of inequality can provide incentives to be more productive, but 
increases from higher levels of inequality would likely lead to rent-seeking 
behaviours.  Thus, also initial inequality levels do matter. In other words, “the 
relationship between equality and economic performance is likely to be 
contingent rather than fixed, depending on the deeper causes of inequality 
and many mediating factors”, as Rodrik [2014] recently commented. We will 
be back on this.  
Though this non-linearity does not seem to be proved when linear 
relations are tested (i.e., the effect of an increase in some Gini points is the 
same at different levels of the Gini coefficient10), it is on the contrary 
confirmed when a non-linear structure is used. In an important 
methodological paper, Banerjee and Duflo [2003] provide a “warning against 
the automatic use of linear models in settings where the theory does not 
necessarily predict a linear or even a monotonic relationship”, and add that 
“data does seem inconsistent with a linear structure” [of the relationship 
between inequality and growth]11. On the same line, Grigoli and Roberts 
[2016] find pervasive evidence of nonlinearities and find in addition that “the 
slope of the relationship between inequality and economic development from 
positive turns negative at a net Gini of about 27 percent, indicating that the 
inequality overhang occurs even at relatively low levels of income 
inequality”.12  Moreover, is it only a problem of levels – a low or high value of 
                                                   
10  Again Cingano [2014] at p. 19 
11  Banerjee and Duflo [2003] at p. 296 
12 Grigoli and Roberts [2016] at p. 3 
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the Gini – and/or of the rate of increase in these levels? It appears that it is 
not. Drawing on harmonised data covering the OECD countries over the past 
30 years, Cingano [2014] shows that it is the gap between low- and lower-
middle income households (the  bottom 40%)  and the rest of the population 
to be relevant. It is the relative inequality in the low portion of the distribution 
that is harmful to growth. Top relative inequality has less, if any, relevance. 
Why?  
The human capital accumulation story comes on stage again. Whether 
the rich be just a little or very far ahead from the average economic resources 
does not matter at all for their investment in education (and what follows 
from that, lato sensu). If the low-income people are below - and far below - 
the average, it will be probably difficult or perhaps impossible for them to do 
the same. Inequality reduces the full achievement of growth reachable in a 
society since it reduces the contribution to human capital from almost the 
bottom half of the distribution, lowering investment opportunities of the 
lower segments of the population. The research specifically aimed at 
evaluating education inequality had already found that it is this element more 
than income inequality to be associated with lower investment rates and, 
consequently, lower income growth.13 However, educational inequality is just 
one of the many unequally distributed opportunities (for instance, access to 
health care or other wealth-enhancing service, or access to the labour market 
for good and regularly paid jobs) whose progressive shrinking is defined by 
Milanovic [2016] as a true structural change. This ongoing societal polarization 
entails that the disadvantages suffered by one generation would shift ahead 
                                                   
13 Castelid and Domenech [2002] 
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to the next generation if suitable policies for remedying were not 
implemented. Sustained, prolonged and unleashed inequality enhances the 
intergenerational transmission of characteristics – social or economic – and 
makes them less escapable.  
This intergenerational – social and economic – (im)mobility is actually 
what emerges as a featuring trait of our times.  In a cross-country comparison 
(initially Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, Canada, UK, 
US, then enlarged to several other countries) Corak [2006] and [2013] has 
tested the relationship between inequality and inter-generational mobility. He 
found what Krueger – economist and ex-Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers – imaginatively labeled as the “Great Gatsby curve” (Figure 1) just 
recalling Gatsby’s difficulties in climbing the social ladder in spite of his 
money.14 This relationship is positive: increasing intergenerational income 
elasticity (IGE) and increasing inequality go together. An increasing IGE 
represents a society with a lesser mobility since a value of 0.8, for instance, 
means that if one father makes 100% more than another the son of the high 
income father will earn 80% more than the son of the relatively lower income 
father. In other words, the closer the index is to 1 the more similar are the 
incomes across generations. “The Great Gatsby Curve is not a causal 
relationship but it is too glib to dismiss it by saying correlation does not imply 
causation” (Corak [2013] at p.85). In the remaining of the article, Corak 
reviews the many pieces of theory that can suit the Great Gatsby Curve, 
concluding that inequality affects mobility because it shapes opportunities 
                                                   
14 A. B. Krueger, “The Rise and Consequences of Inequality in the United States,” speech 
given at the Center for American Progress on January 12th, 2012, where he acknowledges 
the earlier work by Corak. 
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and heightens the income consequences of innate differences between 
individuals.  
 
 
Jäntti and others [2006] paralleled 15  this outcome adding a new 
important perspective. Considering almost the same restricted set of 
countries as of Corak’s [2006], they found that although all countries exhibit 
substantial earnings persistence across generations, the persistence is not 
uniformly distributed (Figure 2). Most of the difference is confined to the tails 
                                                   
15  Corak’s main results go back to his [2006] paper 
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of income distribution showing a great low-income and high-income 
persistence: both the rich and the poor are “trapped” (with very different 
fortunes)! The middle is still mobile in the US and this is probably what has 
sustained until now the narrative of the “American dream”.  
Figure 2. Intergenerational mobility across the earnings distribution 
Just in the US, however, the situation of “the middles” is not the same 
any longer. The hollow-out of the central portion of the income distribution 
contributed to the wide distress –and angriness – of a substantial (numerically 
and ideologically) part of the population, though this phenomenon is not 
confined to the US only. The sociological and political literature is now 
documenting in different form and with different accents this worrying 
phenomenon.16 Here again two are the problems. The first lies in the reasons 
for the discomfort with the social and political life – at issue here – which 
highly reverberates on essential constituency of democracy such as trust, for 
instance. 17 The second is the nature and relevance of who are the main actors 
in this social and political conflict, thing that is likely to determine the 
                                                   
16  Reeves [2017], Williams [2017], Shapiro [2017] 
17 Barone and Mocetti [2014] find a significant and negative effect of inequality on 
generalized trust, and Gould and Hijzen [2016] document the lowering in trust towards 
the others and the institutions both in the US and in several advanced countries.  
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outcome, i.e. the future organization and governance of a society. I will 
discuss this latter issue in a forthcoming work. 
There are of course unexplained parts of the transmission mechanisms 
from one generation to the next one concerning family background or the 
social surrounding environment where beliefs and values are shaped. In this 
framework, and as for Corak’s Great Gatsby Curve, another striking 
“correlation” has emerged: that one between economic inequality and social 
disadvantage. A 2009 study by Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate Pickett provides 
this evidence in a wide sample of rich and industrialized countries. The inter-
deciles ratio P80/P20 – as the measure of inequality – is plotted against a 
composite index  of level of trust, mental illness, life expectancy, infant 
mortality, obesity, children educational performance, teenage birth, 
homicides, imprisonment rates, and social mobility. Whether social problems 
had been caused by material life conditions, the more affluent countries 
should have performed better than the less affluent. No correlation along this 
line emerges (Figure 3). On the contrary, the correlation emerges 
unambiguously as positive once the variable plotted against the social 
composite index is the measure of inequality (Figure 4). The message is 
strong: the more unequal rich countries among the twenty-three sampled do 
worse according to almost every quality of life indicator. 
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Figure 3: Health and social problems are only weakly related  
to national average income among rich countries 
 
Figure 4: Health and social problems are closely related to  
inequality among rich countries  
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1.2 SECOND QUESTION  
Inequality: the reverberation on democracy 
Scholars of democracy firmly state that democracy, either in its ancient or 
modern version, never promised economic equality.18 Democracy promises 
political equality,19 and economic and social inequality is not expected to 
convert necessarily into political inequality. Though not necessarily, they 
however can.  
How to define democracy nowadays, beyond regular elections and 
majority rule, in a world where citizens have many channels  -  associational, 
partisan, functional, territorial, collective, individual - to make their voices 
heard, and to participate in democratic processes?20 The question is hard and 
we leave it to political scientists. Here I will lean upon the Dahlian concept of 
“polyarchic democracy” as the modern connotation of democratic 
government. Actually, I will go even beyond its five requirements for having 
political equality – namely, effective participation, voting equality, 
enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion of adults21  – 
focusing on subsequent requirements to be met in order to assess the quality 
of a democratic order.  These further dimensions – so intertwined as to be 
often difficult to distinguish one from the other – are: rule of law, 
                                                   
18 “In its inception democracy was a project simply blind to economic inequality, regardless 
of how revolutionary it may have been politically. Morally based arguments for 
redistribution ……were marginal or ephemeral”. Przeworski [2010] at p. 85. On the same 
position, Urbinati [2014], Ch. 1.  
19  Dahl [2007] has beautiful passages on the principle of political equality. 
20  Schmitter and Karl [1991] 
21 “To the extent that any of the requirements is violated, the members will not be politically 
equal” Dahl [2000] at p. 38. Many variations of Dahl’s scheme exist, with additional 
institutions, enlargements and refinements (the “thick” conception of democracy). All 
matters that go beyond our goal here and beyond our competences as well.  
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participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, 
freedom, progressive implementation of greater political equality, and 
responsiveness.22 Whenever any of these eight qualitative dimensions is not 
fully realized, political inequality can arise even in a plain democracy because 
they are the basis for active citizenship.  
A complete answer to the question “where does (economic and social) 
inequality impact on” is not given. The existing research in both the 
sociological and political science literature suggests to turn to the wide set of 
political (voting, campaigning…), civil (personal liberties) and socio-economic 
(associated with employment and private property….) rights, which require 
the formal equality of all citizens. Are the social costs of inequality implied by 
the unequal distribution of economic resources likely to affect any of those 
rights in a democratic setting? Can people be politically equal if they are 
socially unequal? In a greater or lesser extent, the answer is no, they cannot: 
differences in the “social power” of the citizens impact on their political 
equality.23  
 “The poor are in the grip of demagogues”, Aristotle stated 2000 years 
ago. The increasing power of “the experts” coming from the technological 
progress tends to mute the voices of whole segments of the population (or to 
make them uniform), marginalizing them; the progressive concentration of 
the media in the hands of a few reduces the pluralism of information, and the 
emergence of a uniform voice lowers the quality of that information. 
Substantially uninformed people cannot fully exercise their political rights. 
                                                   
22 Diamond and Morlino [2004] at p. 21 
23 Among many, Held [2000], Dahl [2004],  Young (2000), Stiglitz [2014] 
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Low-educated people may more easily become victims of political 
manipulation and less interested in the functioning of the institutions of 
democracy, thus contributing to lowering the quality of democracy. The 
intergenerational persistence of disadvantages impedes—or makes very 
hard—any positive evolution for the lowest strata of society, and locks them 
in immobile stratification.  
Similarly, the same disadvantaged segments of population can be 
particularly hit in their freedom by the incomplete implementation of 
essential social rights, such as the rights associated with employment. The 
same segments of population may have a deficit in political equality because 
of fewer opportunities to participate into political life, no chance whatsoever 
to influence either public debate or collective preferences, and no chance to 
control the governmental agenda. A deficit of effective participation arises if a 
part of the population is cut off from the modalities through which collective 
decisions are made, and this in turn determines what policies are actually 
adopted. Those same mechanisms do not affect the rich, who have many 
ways of protecting their status and interests. In the words of Bartels, 
“wealthier and better-educated citizens are more likely than the poor and 
less-educated to have clearly formulated and well-informed preferences. 
Inevitably, socioeconomic inequality percolates through the political realm: As 
Glaeser writes, “The rich can influence political outcomes through lobbying 
activities or membership in interest groups . . . or bribing judges . . . or making 
a mockery of popular democracy”.24  As Bartels writes: “[wealthier are] 
significantly more likely to turn out to vote, to have direct contact with public 
                                                   
24
 Glaeser [2004] at p. 613 
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officials, and to contribute money and energy to political campaigns.”25 Even 
in societies characterized by formally democratic institutions, only affluent 
people and the elites have the “de facto” power, that one arising from an 
informal but nonetheless essential negotiation between political actors.26 
Being able to shape political institutions through their current influence, the 
power of the uppermost tier of society, the elites, expands. As a result, 
political processes may in turn reinforce inequality and an alarming feedback 
loop might therefore take place.27 Thus, the political equality required by 
democracy is seriously damaged. 
2. SOME EMPIRICS 
Political theory has been suggesting at length that inequality should level 
automatically in a democratic setting—or slow down sensibly rather than 
surge—through the working of what is called the median voter mechanism.28  
Besides some theoretical objections,29 this prediction has not been validated 
by facts: inequality surged in almost every democratic country. Thus, either 
                                                   
25  Bartels [2009] at p. 167 
26  Acemoglu and Robinson [2006] and [2008]  
27  Bonica et al. [2013] specifically on the US; Przeworski [2012] 
28 This evergreen theorem was originally introduced in Duncan Black, “On the Rationale of 
Group Decision-making,” Journal of Political Economy 56, no. 1 (1948), 23–34, and later 
developed in Kevin W. S. Roberts, “Voting over Income Tax Schedule,” Journal of Public 
Economics 8, no. 3 (1977), 329–40, and Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, “A Rational 
Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Political Economy 89 (1981), 914–27. The 
most straightforward prediction of this famous theorem is that income redistribution 
becomes popular when the mean income is higher than the income of the median voter. 
According to this theory, in a democratic system the combination of taxes and transfers 
will be the one preferred by the voter who stays exactly in the middle of the 
distribution: the voter who has the median income. Since the empirical distributions in 
all advanced economies exhibit a median income lower than the mean, the higher the 
economic inequality the higher the combination of taxes and transfers in the 
preferences of the median voter should be. Thus, in a majoritarian democracy, it has to 
be expected that high inequality would gradually smooth out.  
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re-distribution did not take place or it was insufficient to prevent inequality 
from surging. 30  In both cases, political accountability emerges as the 
protagonist: the empirical negative correlation between inequality and 
redistribution reported31 is more easily readable as going from inequality to 
redistribution than viceversa. In fact, when inequality persists (or increases), 
“the electors” are not the poor or low- and middle-income citizens since, if 
they were, politicians would actively behave in ways intended to mitigate 
their unfavorable conditions and inequality would slow down. If this does not 
happen, it means that redistribution is avoided on purpose since wealth 
concentration has reverberated into politics. Thus, inequality impacts directly 
on institutions: there is an important piece of theoretical literature in political 
science that emphasizes that inequality will lead to different political 
institutions and in some case less democracy.32 However, empirical research is 
scant and only to some extent supports the view that unequal societies 
develop exploitative institutions.33   
The sociological literature has pointed that economic inequality plays a 
role in a whole array of attitudes and behaviours (such as, for instance, social 
tolerance, trust, participation in voluntary associations…) considered 
important to the health of democracy. In this literature, the question whether 
people’s own economic positions affect their attitudes toward democracy 
finds a clear positive answer: there is a strong negative effect of income 
inequality on support for democracy and ppeople are more likely to have 
                                                                                                                                                                        
29  See Grossman and Helpman [2001] 
30  Milanovic [2000] 
31  Glaeser [2006], Fig. 34.3 at p. 631 
32  Przeworski [2005], Benhabib and Przeworski [2006] 
33  Savoia et al. [2010] 
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favourable opinions of democracy if they are rich and live in a rich country.34 
Just because the ills of society are perceived as potential threats to social 
cohesion and political structures, the social costs of inequality have recently 
drawn investigators’ (a wide array of social scientists from different disciplines) 
attention with an eye on the political consequences.35   
However, the empirical validation of the transmission of socio-
economic inequality into political inequality - i.e. the thesis that the 
stagnating economic fortunes of middle-class and poor people have 
diminished their influence on political agenda - is scant. Though we are 
convinced that money affects politics, political theorists argue that the role 
of nonpolitical resources in shaping political outcomes is not fully proved.36 
They also agree that this might be due to the rudimentary state of the 
measurement of political influence, and to a quasi-impossibility of measuring 
democracy and its quality: “an appropriate democracy indicator is the 
Achille’s heel of empirical analyses”. 37  Consequently, the relationship 
between economic inequality and the quality of democracy remains more a 
matter of speculation than of strict empirical observation.  
Nonetheless, some results – particularly those by Bartels, Gilens and 
Kuhner – are noteworthy. For instance, there is evidence that the rich have 
great influence on the behavior of elected officials, while people in the 
bottom third of the income distribution seem to have no impact, and, in 
general, political leaders appear to react to what middle- and upper-income 
                                                   
34  Andersen [2012] 
35  Nolan et al. [2014], Salverda et al. [2014] 
36  See Bartels [2008] and Przeworski [2010] 
37  Gründler and Krieger [2015], at p. 39. They provide a full scrutiny of the indicators of 
democracy and their (very low) quality. Also Munck and Verkuilen [2002] 
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citizens prefer. “Senators attached no weight at all to the views of 
constituents in the bottom third of the income distribution—the constituents 
whose economic interests were obviously most directly at stake. . . . The 
views of middle-income constituents seem to have been only slightly more 
influential. . . . Senators’ voting decisions were largely driven by the 
ideological predilections of their affluent constituents”.38 Politicians appear 
also not to defend the interest of the many but the desires of the few 
depending on the relative strength of the trade union.39 Therefore, yes, 
responsiveness does exist but it is tilted towards the most affluent citizens.40  
What do these affluent citizens prefer? There is some evidence for the US 
that the top fifth of the income distribution is socially more liberal but 
economically more conservative than others as a whole. Moreover, a (very) 
small sample of the American 1% seems very conservative with respect to 
important policies such as taxation, economic regulation, and especially 
social welfare programs.41  
A fortiori among us economists, the quantitative literature on testing 
the quality of democracy is still very scant and mostly cross-country based 
because of the lack of suitable data. Among the findings there is that 
democracy by itself is not necessarily conducive to institutional quality 
without reference to the economic environment in terms of inequality - 
Sunde et al. [2007]; that high-quality institutions like the rule of law, well-
                                                   
38  Bartels [2008] at p. 265. Bartels himself reports the other studies – always on the US – 
whose results go in the same direction of his. Limited to California only, Brunner et al. 
[2011] find opposite results. 
39 Torija [2013] 
40  Gilens [2012] at p. 1. 
41  Page et al. [2013] 
  
23 
 
functioning regulation, low corruption, and other institutions that improve 
resource allocation have a positive effect on average satisfaction with 
democracy – Wagner et al. [2009]; that higher levels of income inequality 
powerfully depress political interest, the frequency of political discussion, 
and participation in elections (among all but the most affluent citizens!) – 
Solt [2008]; that inequality lowers citizens’ satisfaction and political 
discussion though stimulating the turnout – Maccagnan et al. [2014]. As far 
as I know, this is the only study focussing on a single country (the UK) rather 
than a set, in a long-run perspective.  
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The majority of western democracies are now experiencing – though with 
different degrees and characteristics – high economic inequality, 
compression of low incomes, hollowing out of the “middles”, and increasing 
concentration of wealth in few hands. 
The role that inequality plays in rich and so-called well-established 
democracies prompts serious fears for the political health of their 
institutions. The substantial absence of growth takes to a deterioration of 
the economic and social conditions of the great many with a strengthening 
of social distance and social exclusion, and impoverishment of human and 
social capital. The “misappropriation” of the surplus by the few rich and the 
reverting of economic power into political power weaken the legitimacy of 
institutions, reduce trust and social consensus and subtly deteriorate the 
democratic context. Which outcome would result from this evolution goes 
beyond the goal of this paper. 
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